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Lewandowski: Unequal Distribution of Wealth in China

1. Introduction
China's widening gap in the distribution of wealth following its transition
toward a market economy has been the subject of debate among many scholars. It
is widely agreed that the government plays a large role in the distribution of
wealth, but how and to what extent is where most scholars diverge.
Gul and Lu (2011) argue that despite certain attempts to mitigate
disparities, the Chinese government has negatively affected the distribution of
wealth throughout the country. They suggest that the move toward a more
capitalistic economy has increased competition between private and stated owned
enterprises, which in turn creates more differences in personal income. One of the
specific policies they examine is the Hukou system, which was the housing policy
that divided the economy and segregated urban and rural labor markets. This
policy restricted labor mobility, thus preventing rural residents from opportunities
to earn higher wages and denying them access to the network of urban welfare.
Aside from the policy itself, they argue that various housing reforms have also
had a negative effect on equality. Moving from a unitary housing authority to
various public institutions and state owned enterprises have created an array of
unintentional outcomes such as poor investment structure and unfair distribution
of housing units (Gul & Lu, 2011c, 46). Another cause they examine is the flaw in
the income redistribution system. Rural incomes are generally low while fees and
taxes are relatively high. In cities incomes are higher while benefits and subsidies
are more numerous (Gul & Lu, 2011a, 102). Lastly, they argue that growing
inequality is largely rooted in urban biased growth strategies. State investment is
disproportionately applied to urban industrialization, even though "the rural
population represents 70 percent of the total population and agriculture employs
over 50 percent of the labor force" (Gul & Lu, 2011a, 103).
The topic of policies that are biased toward the urban sector is further
explored in Dennis’ (1999) study on urban-based policies and rising income
inequality in China (p. 306). In his study he uses household survey data from
China's Statistical Bureau to examine the causes of rising inequality. Through his
analysis1, he specifically examines inequality within urban areas, within rural
areas, and between the two. His findings suggest that the sectoral disparity
between urban and rural areas contributes the most to overall inequality. After
discussing the immense role the alarmingly large gap between rural-urban wealth
plays in overall inequality, he presents the idea that this disparity still exists as a
result of government policies that are clearly biased towards the urban sector. He
shows this by pointing out many advantages urban residents enjoy that are widely
1

Analysis used generalized entropy measures and Gini ratios
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unavailable to rural migrants. For instance, state owned enterprises provide
housing for employees and only permanent workers are able to receive health
insurance and pensions. In addition to institutional barriers preventing rural
migrants from having equal services and opportunities, he discusses how
government expenditures and investments are disproportionately utilized in urban
areas. Through the many examples discussed connecting government policies and
rural-urban income inequality, Dennis inadvertently reveals some inconsistencies
in what the policies seek to achieve and their affect on the widening income gap.
Another issue that directly affects the distribution of wealth is the
availability and quality of educational attainment. Scholars widely agree that
access to basic education has improved significantly within the last 40 years,
however unequal access continues to be a severe problem and adds to China's
widening wealth gap. Adams and Hannum (2009) look beyond only education
policy and argue that as a result of the decentralization policies that started in the
mid 1980s, costs increased for social services, which made it significantly harder
for people to afford compulsory education in poor regions. They describe a direct
link between changes in welfare policy decisions and descent into poverty.
Specifically, they link the privatization and decentralization of health care to
rising health care costs which has been known to bring people into poverty. The
higher the health care costs, the less money there is available for educational
attainment. They validate this through an analysis of a survey of households in
Guizhou and Shanxi Provinces that showed that households with hospitalization
had 26 percent less expenditures in education compared to households with
hospitalization2 (Adams & Hannum, 2009, p. 168).
Aside from incomes and costs, barriers to equal education access in China
can be found between 6 different groups: between regions, rural and urban areas,
types of schools, social classes, gender, and ethnicities (Wang, 2011a, p. 227).
Wang proposes the idea that the unequal distribution of access to higher education
between regions is a result of the provincial enrollment policy, which according to
her has a poor rational basis and perpetuates regional and social differences that
are already in existence. In regards to uneven access between rural and urban
areas, she suggests that the difference lies in the quality of education offered as
opposed to the amount of schools. Children raised in rural areas are more likely to
attend regional institutions and enter less common programs because of lower
quality schooling during childhood than that of urban residents (Wang 2011a, p.
237). The social class divide is argued to be a result different approaches that each
social class has to the college entrance examination (Wang, 2011a, p. 239). As far
as gender disparities are concerned, she attributes differences in enrollment
2

Hospitalization in what context was unclear.
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between males and female to a preconceived societal notion that men's education
is more important than that of women's (Wang, 2011a, p. 243). Overall, Wang
(2011a) shows that while differences in educational opportunities have been
gradually declining, differences are still apparent between the 6 different groups
mentioned earlier. She calls for a shift from focusing on the amount of schools
available to the quality of education provided in order to promote truly equal
opportunities.
To this date, many scholars have examined the causes of the increasingly
unequal distribution of wealth from a specific field of study. When policy is
involved in such discussions, it generally only regards specific sets of policy and
its affect on a certain aspect of the wealth divide. This paper intends to take a step
back and examine the progression of policy in housing and education since right
before the reform up to the early 2000's and how each ones implications affects
the effectiveness of others. This paper discusses how the inconsistency in
government policies has largely affected China's increasingly unequal distribution
of wealth in a negative way. This is explored in a comprehensive overview
through reviewing various policies and lack of policies regarding the market
reforms in 1978, specifically, those associated with housing and education policy.
2. Switch to Market Economy and Effects of an Unequal Distribution of
Wealth
Although the tremendous growth China has seen in the last half-century
has improved the standard of living for around 1.2 billion people (Wong & Lu,
2002, p. 370), it has also precipitated the substantial increase in the unequal
distribution of wealth. This has eventually caused China to have more citizens
that live below absolute poverty than that of states with similar per capita income
(measured by purchasing power parity) (Liang, 2009, p. 389). For this reason,
many scholars propose that the transition from a planned to market economy is
the reason why China has experienced such a large increase in inequality. Bian
and Logan (1996) argue that the ability to participate outside government run
sectors have allowed people to earn more than would be possible in a planned
system, therefore leading to inequalities (p. 743). Similarly, Kostello and Szelenyi
(1996) suggest that growing inequality is a result of the transition to a capitalistic
system (p. 1093). While these propositions seem to be valid, there is much more
to the equation than simply the type of market system China uses. The transition
has precipitated the changes in policies that will be discussed, however the
inconsistencies of the changed policies played a large role in how inequality
occurred to such a large extent. In the case of China, it seems that while the
switch from a socialist to a more capitalistic system has created many changes in
the structure in which markets operate and redistribution occurs, the state remains
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to play a large role in how this all plays out through its power in state owned
enterprises and the outcomes of its changes in policies. According to power
persistence theories, stratification mechanisms in place under former
redistributive economies are maintained even with the transition to a more
capitalist economy (Xin, 2009, p. 85). While the causes of inequality change with
the transition, the culprit, that is the government, remains the same.
Although different facets of inequality will be discussed throughout this
paper, one set of data that is useful to examine when judging the unequal
distribution of wealth in a country is the Gini index, which "measures the extent
to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among
individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal
distribution" (World Bank Website).
Figure (1):

Gini Index in China
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Source: The World Bank
Although data is not available for every year and for prior to the economic
reforms in the late 70's, it is clear that overall inequality in China has been
steadily rising. Figure (1) shows the Gini coefficient rising from 19.1 in 1981 to
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42.5 in 2002. In less than 25 years, China managed to become one of the most
unequal societies in the world (Wan & Zhu, 2012, p. 90). This inequality exists in
many areas, most prominently between rural and urban areas, coastal and inland
areas, between men and women, and different ethnicities. This paper will touch
on a bit of each but primarily focus on the rural-urban divides, since it is one of
the most apparent. The graph below shows the rise in income in both agricultural
which will represent rural areas and non-agricultural3 which will represent urban
areas from 12 (1966) years before the reform to 12 years after (1990).
Figure (2):
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2000
From the graph above, one can see that starting in the mid 80's incomes
between the agricultural rural and urban sectors began to diverge, with nonagricultural income increasing at a faster rate than non- agricultural. In 1966 the
3

Non Agricultural consists of the national income of industry, construction, transportation, and
commerce combined
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difference between urban and rural incomes was 20.2 Yuan while in 1990 it was
442.9 Yuan, showing a considerable rise in inequality. Due to a lack of
availability of data, the graph above only shows the beginning of the divergence
between rural and urban incomes, however an array of secondary sources confirm
that this divide has continued to worsen. The inconsistency of government
policies contribution to the widening gap between rural and urban incomes shown
in Figure (2) will be discussed in following sections of the paper. While the
distribution of wealth has been displayed solely in the context of income thus far,
this paper will interpret wealth in much broader terms, including topics such as
access to welfare benefits and property.
After examining some of the ways inequality can be measured, it is natural
to ask why does this matter and what are the effects? While Figure (2) shows a
positive result of market reform through the increase in incomes in both rural and
urban areas, the rapid increase in inequality displayed as well cannot be ignored.
A large degree of inequality has damaging effects and threatens the health of a
country's economy and society. In the case of China, an increasing gap in the
wealth distribution has lead to low domestic demand, threatens social and political
stability, and affects the inability of those at the bottom to afford social
investment (Wan & Zhu, 2012, pgs. 90, 91, 92) A better understanding of the
implications of inequality in China will provide insight into what needs to be done
in order to improve the current state of the distribution of wealth, while stressing
its importance.
A large gap in the distribution of wealth suppresses private demand as a
result of the poor not being able to afford basic consumption while the wealthy
spend a smaller portion of their income, saving more (Wan & Zhu, 2012, p. 92).
According to the law of diminishing marginal propensity of consumption and
Keynesian consumption theory, people at the richer end of the wealth distribution
are more inclined to save money while people at the poorer end are more likely to
spend very little (Gao & Lu, 2011, p. 104). As a result, China's rising degree of
inequality has a negative effect on both the national mean consumption rate and
household consumption growth (Lu & Gao, 2011, p. 104). As you can see in
Figure (3) The share of the household consumption rate of GDP changed from
49.49 percent of GDP in 1978 to 34.38 percent in 2011. The decline in household
consumption's share of GDP shows that China's growth is primarily driven by
exports and investment (Gong & Li, 2011, p. 325). This leaves China's growth at
the mercy of outside forces.
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Figure (3):
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The declining amount of domestic demand shown through household
consumption rates is unhealthy for China because it weakens economic growth,
which in turn leads to "surplus liquidity, investment inefficiency and economic
instability" (Wang, 2011b, p. 1). Aside from the unequal distribution of wealth,
Chinese Household Consumption has been negatively affected by the uncertainty
caused from the switch from a planned to a market economy (Xu, Dai, & Zhong,
2010, p. 344). With economic reforms across the board, consumers became
unsure about the rate of their future consumption. This caused them spend less
and save more in order to be able to afford services such as health and housing
that were previously provided by the government (Xu, Dai, & Zhong, 2010, p.
344). Overall, China's consumption pattern is similar to that shown in Engle's
law, that is, the proportion of spending on necessary items usually decreases as
income increases (Wong & Lu, 2002, p. 373). With incomes rising in most
sectors, the distribution of wealth is negatively affected. This combined with the
people living in poverty consuming very little maintains China's decreasing
household consumption.
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Another prominent consequence of a high degree of inequality is it's
negative effect on social and political stability. China's history is wrought with
uprisings caused by a general feeling of unfairness. Through examining the nature
of inequality since the market reforms, it is clear that China is prone to such
instability once again. Nearly 75% of minorities reside in poor western regions,
which houses 22% of the population and domestic migrants are becoming
increasingly dissatisfied with government at the local level according to a recent
study (Wan & Zhu, 2012, p. 90). This could lead to ethnic tensions, a lack of
confidence in government policies (worsening the already inconsistent role of
government policy plays in distribution of wealth), and pose a threat to China's
sovereignty and unity. Aside from social unrest, rising inequality could lead to an
increase in crime rates (Gao & Lu, 2011, p. 120). One study showed property
infringement cases increase as urban-rural per capita income ratio rose (Gao &
Lu, 2011, p. 120). Such internal problems have wide reaching effects, such as a
decreasing investment and discouraging economic activity (World Bank on
Poverty).
Another side effect of a large degree of inequality in China is that the
poorer people are not able to afford social investment (Wan & Zhu, 2012, p. 91),
in areas such as education, housing, and health. This makes it very difficult to
reduce the level of poverty and also hinders national prosperity, for such social
investments have spillover effects that make its negative impact much broader
(Wan & Zhu, 2012, p. 91). Figure (4) shows the difference between urban and
rural areas in per capita expenditures in medicine, medical services, and education
in 1999.
Figure (4)4:

4

Consists of rural and urban areas in 31 regions of China (data was available on 31 regions)

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol1/iss3/1

8

Lewandowski: Unequal Distribution of Wealth in China

Per Capita Living Expenditures of
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It is clear that people in urban areas spend a significant amount more than
the traditionally poorer rural regions at a difference of 175.57 Yuan in medicine
and medical services and 137 Yuan in education. This contributes to the ongoing
cycle that can only be stopped with a reduction of barriers from receiving the
social capital needed to lift them and their family out of poverty. This effect and
its correlation with inconsistency in government policies will be further explored
throughout the paper. Aside from those at the poor end of the distribution not
being able to afford social investment, increasing inequality and its relationship
with growth prevents poverty reduction (Wan & Zhu, 2012, p. 91). When
inequality is high, as it is in China, the impact growth has on reducing poverty is
smaller than it would be in a more equal society, and rising inequality also offsets
the aspects of growth that reduce poverty (Wan & Zhu, 2012, p. 91). As a result
of this, redistribution could be viewed as more important than growth as a method
of reducing poverty in China (Wan, 2006, p. 21).
The impacts discussed resulting from the unequal distribution of wealth
are very important to the success and future outlook of China. The combination of
low domestic demand, threats to social and political stability, and the inability of
those at the bottom to afford social investment create a difficult situation in
China's efforts to become and economically strong 'harmonious society.' Now that
the effects of an unequal distribution of wealth and therefore the importance of a
more equal society are established, the role of government policies in the
education and housing sector will be explored.
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Part 3: Education
Primary and Secondary
Considering the strong correlation between educational attainment and
higher income (Wei, 1999, p. 167), the education system in China is very
important topic when studying the distribution of wealth in a state. Following the
economic reforms in the late 70's, the economic returns to education in the urban
sector have risen significantly, and nearly tripled between 1992 and 2003 (Adams
& Hannum, 2009, p. 156). In rural areas on the other hand, education became the
main factor behind one's ability to find off-farm jobs by 2000 and each additional
year of schooling increased wages by 6.4 percent (Adams & Hannum, 2009, p.
156). The increasingly important role of education in one's eventual economic
status leaves those who lack basic schooling very prone to living a life of poverty,
therefore contributing to the China's unequal distribution of wealth. Fortunately,
access to all levels of education had risen significantly since the economic
reforms in the late 70's. However, access to educational opportunities remains
very unequal with disparities existing between different ethnic groups, genders,
urban and rural areas, coastal and inland areas, and between provinces. My
research focuses on the inconsistent impact of policy on education, specifically
between the rural and urban sector, since it is one of the more prominent issues.
The disparities in education between rural and urban areas stem from a
multitude of policies that are specifically prejudiced towards urban areas. Such
policies have direct effects on income, which therefore affects the distribution of
wealth and the ability for parents to afford to send their children to school. Dennis
(1999) argues that "...urban biased policies and institutions, including labor
mobility restrictions, welfare systems, and financial policies of inflation subsidies
and investment credits to the urban sector, are responsible for the long-term ruralurban divide and the recent increases in disparity" (p. 306). Despite a series of
reforms to reduce the urban-rural division such as increases in procurement prices
for agricultural products, the implementation of household responsibility systems,
and the ease of restrictions on labor mobility in rural areas to non-agricultural
sectors and employment in urban areas, urban residents remain significantly
advantaged due to the presence of certain policies (Dennis, 1999, p. 308). For
example, urban residents receive far more welfare benefits than rural migrants.
State-owned enterprises and other government agencies still are able to provide
housing as well as health insurance and pensions for their permanent employees,
leaving rural migrants to cover these costs on their own (Dennis, 1999, p. 309).
Additionally, childcare and elementary and middle school educations are not
available to the children of migrants that lack the ability to obtain urban
registration (Dennis, 1999, p. 309). They end up paying up to three times the
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amount that locals pay for the often lesser quality education through 'temporary
student fees'. (Gul & Lu, 2011b, 160). Moreover, they are often segregated into
different classes because of urban parents fear that migrant children would take
away from their own child's education (Gul & Lu, 2011b, 160).
Aside from the lack of benefits rural migrants receive in urban areas, the
disparity is also a result of the government's financial transfer programs, which
are biased towards the urban sector. The 8.5 percent inflation experienced
between 1985 and 1992 affected the entire country, however the investments and
government spending that was held responsible for this inflation were allocated to
urban areas disproportionately to rural areas (Dennis, 1999, p. 309). Furthermore,
discretionary policies have been found to negatively affect the income of people
living in rural areas. For instance, following inflation in the late 80s, discretionary
policies were implemented that constricted investment credits mainly to rural
areas in 1989 employment (Dennis, 1999, p. 309). This lead to a reduction in
township and rural enterprises as well a drop in employment and real output. On
the other hand, from 1989-1992 real output of state owned enterprises rose as well
as employment (Dennis, 1999, p. 309). From these examples it is clear to see that
policies biased toward the urban sector create severe disadvantages for rural
residents, which either directly or indirectly worsen the unequal distribution of
wealth.
Through the increases in urban subsidies, investments, and credits, the
rural are left severely disadvantaged when it comes to being able to afford
education for their children because of their lower income. In a study done on the
educational barriers in rural areas of Gansu, where 76 percent of the population
lives in rural areas, one of the top reasons for children leaving school according to
village leaders, mothers and children was the inability to afford costs, such as
school supplies and fees charged by the school in order to stay open (Adams &
Hannum, 2009, p. 161). The difficulties of staying school can be seen when
looking at the percentage of dropouts in any given year. In 1990, an average of
1.4% and 4.9% of students dropped out of primary school in urban areas and rural
areas respectively (China Statistical Yearbook 1991).5 In conjunction with this,
about one-fourth of children stated that they didn't attend school because they
were needed at home, suggesting that the opportunity cost of them going to school
5

Calculated by averaging the difference of students and the beginning of the year and end of the
year in rural areas (Inner Mongolia, Anhui, Jiangxi, Guangxi, Hainan, Guizhou, Tibet, Shaanxi,
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang) and urban areas (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning,
Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong). How area was determined
rural or urban is discussed on page 23.
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were just too high (Adams & Hannum, 2009, p. 161). This combined with the
disequalizing effects of the funding policy has put poor rural families in a tough
position. This is especially damaging considering the lack of education is
perpetuated for future generations. As former head of the Education Commission
of Hunan Province put it, "a lack of education is the beginning of a vicious circle
that leads to social inequality and traps people into poverty" (152).
Although there are policies in place that are specifically intended to reduce
the income gap between rural and urban areas, the presence of urban biased
policies either lessen or prevent them from having any positive affect.
Considering the importance of a more equal society to the success of China, each
policies' potential affect on the distribution of wealth needs to be examined before
they are implemented to insure policies targeted towards reducing the problem
can take full effect.
One of the more important laws that have the potential to mitigate
education disparities is the Compulsory Education Law. Established in 1986, it
intended to expand education by providing nine free years of education to all
children. As the law states, it also intended to "improve the quality of instruction
and enable children and adolescents to achieve all-round development--morally,
intellectually and physically--so as to lay the foundation for improving the quality
of the entire nation and for cultivating well-educated and self-disciplined builders
of socialism with high ideals and moral integrity" (Compulsory Education Law).
Starting at age 6, children were to begin school regardless of sex, race, or
nationality (Compulsory Education Law). In theory, this law would greatly lessen
the gap in China's distribution of wealth. Guaranteeing a basic education for
everyone in China puts those children who didn't have access schooling before the
law in a better position to further their education and obtain a better job with
higher income. However, this has not occurred to the extent it should have. As a
result of drastic and frequent changes in it’s funding and the presence of 'mixed
changes,' the compulsory education law is wrought with inefficiencies. Frequent
changes have prevented the law from lessening inequality through creating
difficulties with implementation and wasting financial resources while the
presence of 'mixed changes' have weakened funding.
Within the last 20 years, Chinas Compulsory Education Policy has
experienced many adjustments. The time between major changes in the
compulsory education laws funding policy range between .5 years to 8.3 years,
with an average of every 2.5 years (Wei, 2008, p. 118). This leads to a number of
issues regarding fairness, effectiveness and efficiency. The table below shows the
amount of time that passes between each major change in the compulsory
education policy from 1986-2006.
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Figure (5):
Major policy changes from 1986-2006
Jul '86 - established "township input"
Nov '94 - Taxsharing system
Jan '00 - Tax and fee reform
May '01 - Responsibility handed to local
governments
Jul '04 - One fee system
Mar '05 - 2 remission and one subsidy
Dec '05 - Rural tuition and fees waived
Jun ' 06 - New Compulsory Ed. Law
Source: (Wei, 2008, p. 117)

Amount of time
changes in years

between

8.3
5.2
1.3
3.2
0.7
0.8
0.5

As the table shows, the more time passes; changes in policy seem to occur
more frequently. In general, numerous rapid changes to policies tend to lead to the
policies unfairness because "policy impartiality requires a series of explicit, fixed,
universal, objective conduct rules, if a policy is changed arbitrarily and
frequently, which will have an impact on the distribution of authority of wealth,
power, social status, opportunities to lead to unfair results” (Wei, 2008, p. 118).
This generalization proves to be true in the case of drastic changes in China's
compulsory education policies. The changes listed mostly deal with the source of
funding and where the responsibilities of certain duties lie and were formulated
upon realization that adjustments needed to occur. They essentially provide the
structure of how the law should be funded, ran, and maintained.
One of the negative side effects to the radical changes in funding policy
includes creating issues for the implementation of each new policy. As Wei
(2008) argues, "educational policy gains recognition and builds consensus on the
basis of deep interpretation. Only in this way can it be implemented actively,
properly and effectively" (p. 118). When policy is changed so often, it is difficult
for education policy makers and implementers to fully understand and
contextualize what exactly the changes mean, making it more difficult for the
goals of the new policy to be implemented successfully (Wei, 2008, p. 118). With
such a short amount of time between changes, the intended result of each change
is not reached because there is a lack of time for policy reorientation to occur
(Wei, 2008, p. 118).
Another negative effect of rapid policy change is that it is very cost
inefficient in a couple of ways. One way is through the costs associated with
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terminating a policy that is still in effect. The legal procedures required do so
costing money, and when a policy is terminated before its goal has been reached
the resources already put into that policy going to waste. Another way it is cost
inefficient is because both formulating and changing a policy are very expensive
(Wei, 2008, p. 118). When the policy changes frequently, costs accumulate and
funds are funneled from the education system to unnecessary costs. Through
wasting funds and creating problems with implementation, the frequent changes
hinder the compulsory education law from being as effective as it was designed to
be, therefore preventing it from having the intended result of reducing inequality
through providing equal access.
In addition to drastic changes in funding policy, the presence of 'mixed
changes' can cause previously existing policies and new policies to be mutually
weakening (Wei, 2008, p. 120). For example, China's fiscal and tax reform in
conjunction with the compulsory education investment policy creates challenges
for funding education through weakening the main source of funding, local
government funding (Wei, 2008, p. 120). The tax sharing reform changed the way
revenues were shared between the central government and provincial
governments by dividing tax revenue into 3 categories: central, local, and shared
(Shaoguang, 1997, p. 2). This led to a divide between financial rights and
administrative power, which caused the decay of public spending at the county
level (Wei, 2008, p. 120). It also gathered financial rights on higher governments,
which gradually caused financial power at county levels to weaken significantly,
disturbing the flow of education spending (Wei, 2008, p. 120). Without a strong
and clear source of funding, chances for successful implementation were
weakened. Another example of 'mixed changes' is the effect of the one fee system
on compulsory education's financial input. Prior to the one fee system, schools
were able to charge students for things such as school maintenance, newer
facilities, use of supplies, etc. While preventing the charge of extra fees to
students could be beneficial for children from low-income, it has not been
supported through additional funds in the compulsory education financial input by
governments, therefore "confusing the investment system" (Wei, 2008, p. 120).
Despite the one fee system many schools still frequently charge students various
fees out of necessity, making it more difficult for lower income families to send
their children to school.
The effects of both drastic changes in China's Compulsory Education Law
funding policy and the mutually weakening effect of 'mixed policy' can be seen
when examining the percentage of provinces that are able to fulfill the nine-year
compulsory education program. Although it was implemented in 1986, as of 1998
seven of the 22 provinces had an education supply below 60% and at the start of
the new millennium this education program was still not available in 20 % of
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China's rural villages (Gul & Lu, 2011b, 152). When examining these figures it is
important to keep in mind that Chinese officials are known to artificially inflate
enrollment figures, (Gul & Lu, 2011b, 152). As a result of this, it is reasonable to
state that the Compulsory education law has been even less effective than official
Chinese statistics show. There are also problems with getting accurate data at the
local level where education officials make sure that the attendance roster has
every child's name that is supposed to be on it, whether or not they are actually
ever able to attend a single day of school (Gul & Lu, 2011b, 152). Students are
also borrowed from other schools when inspectors come around in order to
receive funding that would have been allocated to the missing students (Gul & Lu,
2011b, 152). Whether enrollment rates are exaggerated or not, judging from the
data that is available, the Compulsory education law has not been as effective as
intended and huge disparities in educational attainment still exist across China. If
frequent and mixed changes were not an aspect of the policy, it would have been
efficient and properly funded, therefore increasing access to education to the most
disadvantaged areas of the country. This eventually would have helped in the
reduction of inequality.
Along with frequent and mixed policies, a lack of compensation for
schools requiring additional funding also significantly reduced the ability of the
Compulsory education law to help narrow the gap of the unequal distribution of
wealth. Tsang and Dings (2005) study "Resource Utilization and Disparities in
Compulsory Education in China" revealed that inequalities in access to funding
and resources between the different regions in China. They found that the topspending region on primary education spent up to 5.2 times as much as the
bottom-spending region (p. 5). This is partly due to differences in the breakdown
of where the funds and resources come from. Schools in less privileged areas rely
more on funds from the government and are mainly used for paying personnel
(Tsang & Dings, 2005, p. 21). This is especially true in poor rural areas where the
inability to obtain funds and resources outside the government leads them to
spend very little on non-personnel inputs. Although government funding is similar
for urban and rural areas, urban areas have a huge advantage due to their ability to
obtain additional resources from both government and non-government sources
(Tsang & Dings, 2005, p. 21). This allows urban schools to spend more on nonpersonnel inputs such as better facilities, school supplies, teacher's aides, etc.
therefore enhancing the overall quality of education they receive over rural
students (Tsang & Dings, 2005, p. 21). Although data regarding the source of
education funding is not available specifically between urban and rural areas,
proxy data could be used to obtain a general idea of the said difference. Regions
whose percentage of employees that are in primary industries exceeds 50 percent
represent rural areas while regions whose percentage of employees in secondary
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and tertiary industries exceeds 50 constitute the urban areas.6 The graph below
displays the disparities in funding between 13 regions representing the urban
sector and 13 regions representing the rural sector.78

Figure (6):9
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Expenditures for Education in 1999
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6

Data for found in China Statistical Yearbook 2000, page 117
Data was available for 31 Regions. 18 fit under the rural category and 13 under the urban
category. 5 random rural regions were not counted in order to make it an even comparison of 13
regions from both sectors.
8
Urban Regions - Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hubei, Guangdong
Rural Regions - Inner Mongolia, Anhui, Jiangxi, Guangxi, Hainan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Tibet,
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang
9
Amount of funds from social organizations and citizens were not available for Beijing (Urban)
7

and Tibet (Rural)
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2000
Although the data shown is only from one year (1999), secondary sources
suggest this has been the trend of funding for an extended period of time. The first
observation to be noted is that amount of funding for urban areas far exceeds that
of the rural areas at 172,386,680,000 Yuan and 56,014,140,000 Yuan
respectively. When examining the breakdown of the source of these funds, the
urban proxy receives 57% of its funds from the government at 97,898,690,000
Yuan and the urban proxy receives 76% of its education funds from the
government at 42,582,060,000 Yuan. This shows that the urban areas receive a
significant amount more from outside sources than rural areas. The consequences
of additional funding in urban areas can be seen when looking at the difference in
the number of students per staff between urban and rural areas. In primary schools
in 1999, there were 17.17 and 22.3 students per staff member in urban and rural
areas respectively (China Statistical Yearbook 2000). In Secondary schools there
were 11.8 and 16.52 students per staff member in urban and rural areas
respectively (China Statistical Yearbook 2000).10 Considering the inequalities that
are created through unequal access to funds and resources for schools across the
country, the Compulsory education law's funding policy should take these
differences into account and respond accordingly. Without measures in place to
counteract the disadvantages that exist between not only urban and rural-areas but
minorities and gender as well, direct charges are increased to parents which create
more barriers for poor students. For these reasons, the compulsory education law
does less than it is capable of to narrow the unequal distribution of wealth in
China.
Higher Education
China is now the third largest higher education provider despite
developing its higher education fairly recently (Wang, 2011a, p. 231). While it
has experienced tremendous growth in higher education since expansion in the
late 1990’s, there still remains the issue of unequal access and its negative effect
on economic and social inequalities. Most national higher education institutions
are located in major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing (Gul & Lu,
2011b, 167). Twenty six percent of the top 100 universities and 30 percent of
central government managed universities are in Beijing, where enrollment of 1822 year olds in higher education institutions is more than double that of the

10

Calculated using the student enrollment of schools in the rural and urban areas of 31 regions in
China divided by the number of teachers and staff in the same areas in both primary and regular
secondary schools in 1999.
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national average (Gul & Lu, 2011b, 167). Such statistics illustrate the divide in
access to higher education between rural and urban areas.
Although the differences in rates of admission between urban and rural
areas vary depending on the type of institution, urban residents remain more
likely to attend a university than rural residents for a variety of reasons. One
major source of unequal access stems from the disparities in education access at
the primary and secondary level. As a result, the various policy effects on lower
levels of education discussed earlier have an impact on higher education as well.
Through less education and poorer quality schooling rural students are subject to,
they are not as prepared to pass the college entrance exam as more privileged
urban students are. Aside from being more inclined to have a better access to
primary and secondary education, urban students are better equipped to have
better scores on the exam because of the importance it stresses on Chinese and
English language skills, which are not taught in rural areas to the degree they are
in urban areas (Wang, 2011a, p. 235). In this way, many of the differences in
access to higher education between rural and urban areas are caused by the same
sources of inequality that we see in primary and secondary education. This allows
such policies to continue to contribute to the unequal distribution of wealth.
Another impact that access to higher education has on the distribution of
wealth relates to the differences between demands for different majors. Popular
programs are generally more competitive because they are more likely to lead to
higher paying jobs and social status (Wang, 2011a, p. 236). This raises tuition
fees for these majors, making it less accessible to rural students. A study
conducted in 2009 assessing the likelihood of rural and urban students to be
accepted to 11 different programs showed considerable disparities. In economics,
law, and management, urban students were admitted respectively 4.32, 3.15, and
2.68 times more than rural students (Wang, 2011a, p. 236). Agricultural science,
history, and education on the other hand showed considerably more equal results.
A likely cause of this is that students from rural areas are more inclined to choose
a major with low tuition fees. Considering the majors with higher tuition fees are
more likely to lead to a higher paying job in the future, this disparity effects the
distribution of wealth down the line.
The relationship between government policy, education, and the
distribution of wealth consists of a very complex web of relationships. Since each
additional year of education provides additional income, a lack of education can
lead to life of poverty. Once this cycle of poverty has begun, it becomes very
difficult for parents and future generations to break out of. Since government
policy dictates the education system, it naturally has a very large effect on the
degree and quality of access. The drastic changes in the compulsory education
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laws funding policy, mutually weakening 'mixed policies,' and the lack of
compensation for disadvantaged rural schools create a domino effect that
eventually assists in the creation and maintenance of China's huge gap in the
distribution of wealth. It first makes it more difficult for marginalized children to
receive a primary and secondary education, and eventually makes it more difficult
to attend a higher education institution. The resulting consequences are
significantly lower incomes for the already disadvantaged and higher incomes for
the more privileged urban residents.
Part 4: Housing
Another important subject to examine in the context of inequality is
housing policy. As one of the most important elements of social policy, it gives us
a clear picture of social stratification and varying income levels. As Zhang (2010)
states, "House, the most basic and essential resource of human survival and
development, is one of the key indicators in building a harmonious society, which
measures the quality of life in a country or region" (p. 97). Like education policy,
housing policy has undergone many radical transformations since market reforms
in the late 70's that directly affect its method of distribution and therefore its
impact on the unequal distribution of wealth. Each one of these policies contains
its own sort of 'self closeness' that neglects to improve the fairness of access to the
housing market (Zhang, 2010, p. 99). Through the disregard for the pre-existing
structure of the housing system when developing housing policies, the affects of
housing reform have been inconsistent and have significantly contributed to
China's widening gap in the distribution of wealth.
Much of China's housing inequality stems from unintentional affects of
housing reforms since 1978. Regarded as one of the most important facets of
public-sector reform in China, housing reform seeks to improve competition,
privatize housing stock, and achieve equity and efficiency (Tolley, 1991, p. 1).
This mainly consists of decreasing the role the government has in the housing
market through encouraging private home ownership. Although each change in
housing policy pushes for more decentralization and privatization, housing
resources remain to controlled by "gate keepers or cadres" through redistribution
(Lee, 2000, p. 62). The main 'gate keeper' in the distribution of housing is the
work-unit, otherwise known as Danwei, which plays a very active role in people's
lives through providing jobs as well as social and political needs (Xing, 2000, p.
523). Prior to housing reforms launched 10 years after the market reforms in
1988, public housing was predominately constructed, owned, distributed, and ran
by work-units (Xing, 2000, p. 523). In order to obtain housing, nearly everyone
had to go through a work unit, which received budgetary funding for the
distribution of housing from the government. Following the reforms, the
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responsibility of the government and work-units changed from being that of
providers to "enablers and mediators" in the housing process (Xing, 2000, p. 523).
Instead of directly providing housing to its employees, work units bought housing
on the market at full price from development companies then sold it to its
employees at greatly discounted prices (Zhang, 2002, p. 11). Significant portions
of these development companies were run by the state. In 1997, 8,164 out of the
21,286 development companies in China were government owned, maintaining its
important role in housing (Xing, 2000, p. 522). This created an unusual situation
in which the supply side of the market functioned as a market basis while
distribution functioned similar to welfare (Xing, 2000, p. 524). Although work
units went from directly providing housing to facilitating it through a system of
re-selling at significantly lower prices, its role in the housing system was
strengthened through formation of partnerships in other market forms of housing
supply (Xing, 2000, p. 524). Since work-units are better equipped to afford
housing at full price than individuals and are a much more dominate force in the
housing market, housing prices rapidly rose making it very difficult for
individuals to seek housing options on their own (Xing, 2000, p. 524). This
strengthens the responsibility of work-units in the housing system and makes
people more reliant on the services of work-units to obtain affordable housing.
This combined with the varying degree of work unit’s ability to afford the
purchase of housing in the market for the resale to employees creates a significant
equity problem in access to housing. Not only are people now more reliant on the
work-unit for affordable housing, the profitability of the work-unit is much more
important in its ability to facilitate the purchase of housing for resale to its
employees. Basically, the housing reforms in 1988 were successful in eliminating
the socialist method of directly providing housing to all workers, but it failed in
its to shift to an efficient private market while controlling for a sharp increase in
inequality.
The housing market reforms in 1988 also worsened equality through its
affect on overall income given by work-units. Prior to the reform, the government
strictly mandated wages and there was little room to receive a higher salary (Xie
& Wu, 2008, p. 598). Workers salaries were based on "occupational status,
seniority, and administrative position (Xie & Wu, 2008, p. 598). Following the
reforms, many changes occurred that pushed for less regulation of work-units,
allowing them more autonomy to function like an economic entity in a capitalistic
system (Huang & Deng, 2006, p. 628). Base salaries remained to be mandated by
the government, however, work-units gained more control over the distribution of
other benefits and bonuses. One of the main desired outcomes of this was to have
the additional income workers received thorough these bonuses and benefits
depend more on their productivity in order to improve the performance of workers
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and the work-units themselves. This goal was not achieved for a variety of
factors. One reason is that it was soon evident that the success of a work-unit was
contingent on multiple factors aside from the productivity of workers, such as the
number of similar enterprises, technology, and geographical advantage (Xie &
Wu, 2008, p. 563). These circumstances had more of an effect on the bonus
workers received than the their work ethic, therefore failing to develop a
connection between worker productivity and additional income. Another reason is
the dynamic of the manager-worker relationship didn't allow bonuses and
additional benefits to be distributed strictly by level of productivity. Prior to the
reform, managers and workers were codependent; meaning managers needed the
workers to cooperate to maintain credibility as leaders while the workers relied on
the managers for promotions and positive evaluations (Xie & Wu, 2008, p. 566).
The structure of this relationship enabled workers to encourage their managers to
push for raising their incomes through additional sources other than the
government mandated base salary. This put managers in a difficult position, who
as a result of the reforms were pressured to increase workers productivity while
continuing to be responsible for their well being (Xie & Wu, 2008, p. 566).
Managers tended to side with workers through utilizing funds available to
upgrade their workers living situation, which maintained a positive relationship
and fulfilled the parental image that China held as an ideal of local officials
during its imperial years (Xie & Wu, 2008, p. 566). This not only separates a
workers final income from their level of productivity, it makes it contingent on
the profitability of the work-unit they belong to. When bonuses and benefits
become a large portion of final income, a huge equality problem is created.
Estimates show that in the 1980's additional income from work units accounted
for about 33 to 40 percent to total income and in the 1990's it passed 50 percent
(Xie & Wu, 2008 , p. 566). Additionally, members of high earning work-units can
have an income that is up to 2.5 times more than members of less profitable, yet
similar work units (Xie & Wu, 2008, p. 579).
Considering the obvious importance the work-unit had in the distribution
of housing prior to the reforms, reform policies should go deeper by mandating
the relationship between work-units and their employees in order for policies to
achieve their goal. For instance, the government could limit the amount of
housing work-units are allowed to buy off the market and the amount of discount
they are able to give to their employees. This would promote healthy competition
and prevent housing prices from rising due to work-units comprising the majority
of demand. The lack of oversight has caused housing distribution to more or less
remain the same. Although the method of providing housing has been changed, at
the end of the day the work-unit remains mostly responsible. The only difference
it has created is that now the housing provided is based on the profitability of the

Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2013

21

Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

work-unit, which has not been successfully contingent on the productivity of its
workers. Although the reforms created a private market for housing, it is mainly
utilized by work-units, who drive up housing prices. If the government wants to
achieve its goal of a healthy private market with fair access, it needs to recognize
the persisting role of the work-unit in the housing market and act accordingly.
Another fundamental source of housing inequality in China is the Hukou
policy, which is a status given at birth that subjects one to the agricultural (rural)
or non-agricultural (urban) sector order to control the flow of people between
these areas. It has been an agent of stratification and inequality since its initiation
in 1955 and its disequalizing affects have only been exacerbated since 1978. Prior
to the reforms, it was successful in restricting migration in rural areas through
requiring participation in agricultural production through communes in order to
receive food (Wu & Treiman, 2004, p. 364). In urban areas, it was difficult to live
outside the tightly controlled and government run work-units, which made it even
more difficult from migrants to move to cities to find work (Wu & Treiman, 2004,
p. 364). Ascribing whether one must live in a urban or rural area and at birth as
well as restricting mobility strongly dictated which 'life chances' one had available
to them (Wu & Treiman, 2004, p. 365) through automatically determining one's
access to jobs, level and quality of education, health care, and other welfare
benefits (Wu & Treiman 363). The restrictions on migration have been eased
since market reforms, which only increased inequality through the discrimination
and lack of resources available to rural migrants in cities. Through policies that
called for the elimination of the commune system and the changes in the role of
work-units, rural peasants were allowed to enter cities in order to find
employment in the expanding market sector (Wu & Treiman, 2004, p. 365). As a
result of urban biases present throughout the system, families migrating to urban
areas pay much higher prices for the same goods and services, their children have
less access to the education system, and they are forced to live in substantially
worse living conditions (Dennis, 1999, p. 309). So despite the ease of restrictions
on migration, the inequality caused by the household registration system was
worsened through the creation of a 'second class' of rural migrants living in cities
without the same rights as those with urban hukou status (Wu & Treiman, 2004,
p. 365).
Huang and Jiang's (2009) study of the housing inequality in Beijing in the
late 90's provides a strong example of how hukou status can determine ones
access to quality housing. They found that the housing reforms improved housing
consumption for nearly all groups except migrants with rural registration status
living in the city (p. 953), which represents this 'second class'. They were much
less likely to have access to public rental housing and own homes with the help of
subsidies (Huang & Jiang, 2009, p. 953). Around 8 percent of urban migrants and
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4.5 percent of rural migrants owned their home while 58% of local urban
residents and 52% of local urban movers were homeowners (Huang & Jiang,
2009, p. 943). They also found a connection between education and quality
housing. Their study showed that people with a college education had the highest
rate of homeownership at 59% as well as consuming the biggest and best housing
(Huang & Jiang, 2009, p. 943). Access to housing is not just connected with
higher education, but primary and secondary as well. As stated earlier, childcare
and elementary and middle school educations are not available to the children of
migrants that lack the ability to obtain urban registration (Dennis, 1999, p. 309).
They pay up to three times the amount that locals pay for the often lesser quality
education through 'temporary student fees'. (Gul & Lu, 2011b, 160). Moreover,
they are often segregated into different classes because urban parents fear that
migrant children would take away from their own child's education (Gul & Lu,
2011b, 160). Considering the correlation of education and higher income
described earlier, the discriminatory aspect of housing policies exacerbate
inequalities.
One could argue that the government has duly noted the equity problem
caused by housing policy and policies have been put in place to correct it. For
instance, the Economically Affordable Housing Policy attempts to assist low
income families to purchase their own housing through enlarging the housing
supply, managing the structure of real estate investment, and encouraging demand
in the housing market through a variety of policies (Zhang, 2010, p. 101). While
this was a valid effort, it was largely unsuccessful due to the lack of strict
eligibility criteria. In some areas, the low-end houses were purchased by mid-high
income earners (Zhang, 2010, p. 101). In order for the Economically Affordable
Housing Policy to be consistent and affective, it needs to put measures in place to
ensure that affordable housing goes to people who need it, such as assisting those
whose work-unit is unable to provide assistance. It also could put a rule in place
to ensure that low-income housing is only sold to low-income families instead of
being bought up by the middle and upper class. Just like the work-unit, the hukou
system was in place long before the reforms and has significantly shaped the
structure of the housing system. Policies need to weigh the importance of these
two forces and act accordingly. Without effective measures in place to counteract
the disequalizing effects the work-units and registration system have had after the
reforms, policies will remain inconsistent with what they aim to achieve.
Overall, one of the main goals of the housing reforms is to encourage
people to buy their own homes in the private market. This is thought to be
beneficial to individuals and society as a whole through providing better
opportunities (Zhang, 2010, p. 101). Unfortunately, such positive effects are not
realized due to inconsistent housing policies. One of the main issues is that they
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do not take into account how the pre-existing housing structure and policies will
react to attempts of decentralization and privatization. As a result, the work-unit
has strengthened its necessity in obtaining housing and the hukou status has
caused rural migrants in urban areas to be severely disadvantaged. This has
prevented the market from having equal and fair access. Government policies
regarding housing should be more consistent through implementing measures in
work-units and the registration system considering their strong influence in
housing distribution.
Part 5: Conclusion
Policies following the switch from a planned to market economy for the
most part have increased educational attainment and the amount of housing
available in China. At the same time, it has severely increased the unequal
distribution of wealth. While some may argue that this is a direct result of the
nature of a capitalistic system, I argue that the causes are deeper than that, with
the severity of inequality being a product of inconsistent policies. As far as
education is concerned, an increase in inequality has occurred as a result of urban
biased policies, and the presence of frequent and mixed changes in the
compulsory education policy have prevented it from assisting in the reduction of
inequality. As far as housing is concerned, pre-existing housing institutions such
as the work-unit and Hukou registration status have not reacted well to changes in
policy, with their stratification mechanisms heightened in the light of reforms.
One of the primary sources of these issues is the inconsistency in
government policies. Unlike the 'big bang' approach many Eastern European
countries have taken in order to transition from socialism, China's reforms have
been piecemeal, with reforms taking place gradually in many sectors. Each reform
has a different agenda, which often conflicts with existing policies and does not
work efficiently to the overarching goal of achieving private markets that promote
fair competition. Considering the negative effects this has on China, leading to
low domestic demand, threatening social and political stability, and affecting the
inability of those at the bottom to afford social investment, action needs to be
taken in order to improve the large gap in the distribution of wealth. While the
elimination of inequality in a capitalist system is highly unlikely, making sure the
structure of the education system and housing market is free from institutional
barriers that decide ones place in society is not.
In order to address inequality, policies should take into account how it will
affect vulnerable groups such as people living in rural areas, women, ethnic
minorities, and have a system in place to assist them through the process until
they are at a place where they could fairly search for goods and services on the
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open market. While this may sound for a call for regressive move back to a more
socialist system, it is not. The government does not need to directly distribute to
its citizens in order to obtain a better degree of equality. It needs to have a system
in place to make sure that the market is free of 'gate keepers' and that it runs
efficiently and fairly in the short term so vulnerable groups can get their feet on
the ground and be able to participate fairly in the future. For instance, when
drastic reforms of the housing market are put in place, so should reforms for the
agents of distribution such as the work-unit. In the new planned economy, the
achievement of fairness and equality should be an overarching goal when it comes
to making new policies in order to develop a healthy system that can continue to
compete on the world stage. This will help promote political and social stability,
maintain a healthy household consumption, and help people at the low end of the
income spectrum afford social investment, which all will contribute to China's
success in the long term and maintain a 'harmonious society'.
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